Btheoretical integrity^of my argument when I also say that soldiers can legitimately be targeted because of their membership in an army? Only if theoretical integrity and common sense are radically at odds.
Jeff McMahan asks what I would think if a group of army members who have no connection to actual warfare -he mentions accountants, lawyers, and doctors; let_s add cooks, laundrymen, nurses, and clerks -were assembled in an undefended building: Could we legitimately attack them? I don_t know. If the army regularly brought together all its non-combat personnel without regard to their actual activities, then I would have to worry about Jeff McMahan_s question. Since it doesn_t, I don_t. We commonly meet these people in close relation to the combat-ready soldiers whom they assist, and in that relationship, they are liable to attack. I should note, though, that medical personnel have almost always been taken to be immune -ever since the Middle Ages, I believe. They patch up soldiers and send them back into battle, but they also relieve human suffering, and under that second description they seem to belong to the larger human community and not to the army. I take them to be immune too, for that reason, at whatever cost to the theoretical integrity of my argument.
But if doctors in the army are immune from attack because of what they are doing, why can_t we also mark out men and women in civilian society who are not immune because of their activities -if, for example, what they are doing makes them Bmorally responsible for the initiation or continuation of an unjust war.^But even for Jeff McMahan, these civilians are not Busually^liable to military attack, and that is the only kind of liability I am writing about. I certainly agree that civilians can be liable to moral criticism and legal punishment. But the proposition that they can_t Busually^be attacked sounds right to me, if what it means is that Jeff McMahan could come up with a hypothetical case in which we would all want to attack them. I won_t start worrying about whether there is a significant difference between his Busually^and my Balways^until the hypothetical cases start appearing in the real world.
Back to terrorism: Jeff McMahan thinks that terrorism is a crime of means, not of ends. But when terrorists aim, let_s say, at the radical subordination of a group of people, surely they are guilty of a crime of ends. BBut this is contingent,^says Jeff McMahan, Bit is not a necessary feature of terrorism.^I accept that. It is only, as I have said, a common featurehow common is an empirical question; we would have to look at (real) cases. I also want to argue, however, that this is the way people under threat experience terrorism and that this experience ought to weigh heavily in our moral and political judgments about the choice of terror.
Of course, I do think that there is a close, though certainly contingent, connection between terrorist means and ends. Jeff McMahan asks, BWhat if the US had not demanded unconditional surrender but had bombed Japanese cities in order to force a conditional surrender with guarantees of political and cultural independence for postwar Japan^? Would this have been terror bombing? My inclination is simply to return the question: Why is this a hypothetical, rather than an actual, case? Why are the political leaders who plan terrorist attacks so unlikely to think sympathetically about the Bcultural independence^of the people they are attacking? What view of those people underlies the decision to attack them indiscriminately? I don_t claim that there is a single necessary answer to these questions. But I do claim that the choice of terror is not simply a strategic choice; it is commonly connected to larger, and pernicious, moral views and political aims.
I have written a political essay (even though it is being published in a philosophical journal). My purpose is to argue against all the excuses and apologies that are made for terrorism and to urge a general condemnation -and then to insist that counter-terrorist activities meet the same moral standard that we apply, or should apply, to terrorists. Jeff McMahan doesn_t attempt, and I assume would not want to make, an opposing political argument. He offers a philosophical critique, which would be entirely appropriate if I had written a philosophical essay. I don_t mean to say that philosophical standards of consistency and clarity don_t apply to political essays; they do. I meet them as best I can and sometimes, no doubt, fail to meet them. But arguments about necessary and contingent truths and strange hypothetical cases that no real-world actor will ever confront -these are not useful, it seems to me, in political debate.
